Labour is Not a Commodity: Reappraising the Origins of the Maxim

Abstract

Th e commodifi cation of labour is a frequently recurring expression in contemporary labour law discourse. It captures concerns with recent trends expressed in terms of deregulation, fl exibility and dismantling of worker protection, and conceptions of labour law in crisis.1 In this context ‘commodifi cation’ is a negation of the essential, foundational perception of non-commodifi cation of labour, epitomized in the maxim ‘Labour is not a Commodity’. Th is maxim is familiar to labour lawyers of today, being enshrined in the 1944 Philadelphia Declaration, which is an integral part of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization. Its origin, however, is older. It is, moreover, arguably a simplifi cation. Labour is also, but not just, a commodity. It is in this fashion the maxim fi rst appeared and found its way into the 1919 ILO Constitution. In this article I do not, however, set out to discuss the relative aspects of commodifi cation and non-commodifi cation of labour, or whether the argument of non-commodifi cation is capable of legitimizing labour law.2 Th e aim of this contribution is, rather, to trace the origins of the maxim. In doing so, I off er a diff erent narrative from that of Paul O’Higgins. In his well-known article from 1997, O’Higgins ascribed fatherhood of the maxim to the Irish sociologist and economist Dr. John Kells Ingram (1823‒1907),3 pointing specifi cally to the address that Ingram gave to