Labor Markets, Industrial Monopolization, Welfare, and Imprisonment: Evidence From a Cross-Section of U.S. Counties

Abstract

Various theorists posit that the rate of unemployment is linked to the rates of both welfare and imprisonment. This assumes a competitive labor market tied to specific controls of surplus populations. This article argues that contemporary labor markets lie on a continuum between competitive (secondary) and relatively non-competitive (primary) structures which creates a pattern of labor market segmentation. Such segmentation is linked with specific policies of incarceration or welfare, depending on the competitiveness of the labor market. Data from a cross-section of urban, industrial U.S. counties test the relationship between labor market segmentation, monopolization of industries, and the rates of welfare and imprisonment, controlling for a variety of other relevant variables. Regression analyses results suggest that as labor market structures become less competitive (i.e., move from predominantly secondary toward predominantly primary labor market characteristics), rates of welfare recipients and welfare benefits rise and rates of imprisonment fall. They also suggest that increasing industrial monopolization raises rates of imprisonment and lowers rates of welfare benefits. These findings indicate that the two major dimensions of economic segmentation (industrial competition and labor market competition) oppositely affect levels of welfare benefits and rates of imprisonment.