La tradición de jardinería del siglo XVIII y la posibilidad de emitir juicios estéticos puros de objetos artísticos

Ricardo Rojas

doi:10.18800/estudiosdefilosofia.201701.004

Abstract

At the third section of the “Analytic of the Beautiful” of the Critique of Judgement, Kant establishes the difference between pure judgements of taste and judgements of adherent beauty. The Author contends that the definitions presented there are problematic when one attempts to reconcile them with judgements of artistic beauty. In principle, every work of art supposes certain concepts and contents that determine it as an artistic object, so it would not be possible to formulate pure judgements of taste in their regard. In order to overcome these difficulties, it becomes necessary to articulate the ideas in relation to the nature of artistic production that Kant presents in the sections on Fine Art and the Genius, where the concept of “aesthetic ideas” (understood as internal intuitions of artistic objects) is introduced. Finally, the debate on landscape and gardening in the 18th century allows us to understand how pure judgements of taste can be made from two different ways of presenting aesthetic ideas in an artistic genre.

Highlights

Abstract: “18th Century Gardening Tradition, and the Possibility of Pure Aesthetic Judgments on Artistic Objects”
The debate on landscape and gardening in the 18th century allows us to understand how pure judgements of taste can be made from two different ways of presenting aesthetic ideas in an artistic genre
Ciertamente, Kant se mostraba reacio ante toda obra de arte cuyo diseño se fundamentara sólo en una cierta regularidad, debido a que, para él, tiene escasa capacidad de producir en el sujeto la relación armónica entre sus facultades de conocimiento necesaria para producir juicios de gusto: “Todo lo rígido-regular (que se aproxima a la regularidad matemática) conlleva en sí algo contrario a gusto: es que no brinda ningún entretenimiento prolongado con su contemplación, sino que aburre, en la medida en que no tenga expresamente por propósito el conocimiento o un fin práctico determinado”(1991, §22, B71)