La stratégie soviétique en Afghanistan et ses limites

Abstract

Soviet Strategy and Its Limitations in Afghanistan, by Olivier Roy In the short term, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan can be viewed as a reaction to the collapse of a neighbouring communist regime, but in the long term it must be seen rather as an expansionary pus h towards warm-water ports. The USSR's ultimate goal is the integration of Afghanistan within the Soviet world, though the implementation of this strategy is very flexible. The Soviets seek to maintain the war within limits compatible with their other priorities. They are reluctant to raise the present level of intervention, preferring to rely on their present three pronged policy, which consists of military force to contain rebel strongholds, a pacification programme aimed at disarming the country-side, and a slow but steady sovietisation of the towns. However, the steady reinforcement of Afghan résistance présents them with a difficult set of choices. They must either strengthen their expeditionary force, use chemical weapons, destabilise Pakistan or negotiate. Should Président Reagan propose to negotiate on regional conflicts, it is feasible that the Soviets would embark on negotiations on Afghanistan. Their sole aim would of course be American and Pakistani withdrawal front participation in the conflict, as it is improbable they would seriously envisage pulling out their troops even in exchange for a genuine neutralisation of Afghanisation.