Abstract
The structure-mapping theory posits that the central component in establishing an analogy is to discover that two situations share a system of similar relations. Two experiments were performed to evaluate the hypothesis of the categorical approach that relational similarity does not constitute a necessary nor a sufficient condition for people to judge that two facts are analogous, and that the determinant factor is whether or not the compared facts belong to a common schema-governed category. In both experiments, 20 psychology students received a base fact and two target facts describing simple events, and they had to evaluate how analogous the base and each of the target facts were. In Experiment 1 both target facts included relations that were not similar to those included in the base fact. However, while in the first target fact the object to which the action described by the relation was applied made the whole fact became an exemplar of the schema-governed category applicable to the base, the object of the second target fact made it became an exemplar of an alternative schema-governed category. Experiment 2 has the same structure than the first one, with the only difference being that base and target relations were similar. In both experiments results showed that the first target fact was considered analogous to the base fact, but not the second one. This evidenced that relational similarity is not necessary (Experiment 1) nor sufficient (Experiment 2) to consider that two facts are analogous, and that, instead, the criterion employed by people to determine that two facts are or are not analogous is category membership. We discussed the implications of these results for the development of theoretical and computational models on analogical thinking.
Highlights
La similitud de relaciones como un rasgo definitorio de las analogías the compared facts belong to a common schema-governed category
In Experiment 1 both target facts included relations that were not similar to those included in the base fact
While in the first target fact the object to which the action described by the relation was applied made the whole fact became an exemplar of the schema-governed category applicable to the base, the object of the second target fact made it became an exemplar of an alternative schema-governed category
Summary
La teoría de proyección de la estructura considera que realizar una analogía consiste en descubrir que dos situaciones, cuyas entidades no son parecidas, comparten una estructura de relaciones similares (Gentner, 1983, 1989; Gentner & Markman, 1997). Es posible establecer dos grupos de correspondencias entre estas situaciones: (a) aquél que pone en correspondencia las relaciones jugar y entretenerse y sus argumentos (Juan y perro, en tanto agentes de dichas acciones, y fútbol y ovillos de lana, en tanto objetos a los que se aplican las acciones), y (b) aquél que pone en correspondencia amar y adorar y sus argumentos (Juan y perro, y María y huesos de asado). De acuerdo con esta teoría, si dos relaciones mantienen un parecido en un nivel muy abstracto y trivial de representación (e.g., amar y comer son dos actividades) el sistema cognitivo no admite que sean apareadas y, por lo tanto, juzga como no análogas las situaciones de las que estas relaciones forman parte (Gentner & Markman, 2005). En tanto el parecido de entidades no cuenta en absoluto para que dos hechos sean considerados análogos (e.g., el hecho de que María y huesos de asado sean diferentes no hace que los hechos no sean análogos), la similitud de relaciones constituye, por lo que respecta al papel de la semántica en el razonamiento analógico –junto a los requisitos formales descritos– una condición necesaria y suficiente (i.e, un componente definitorio) para que dos hechos sean vistos como análogos
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