‘La République des Dupes’

Abstract

Abstract WRITING four years before de Gaulle came to power in 1958, Herbert Liithy declared in a political obituary: ‘General de Gaulle was and remained a politician of catastrophe; he thought in terms of catastrophe, he judged men and institutions by their behaviour in catastrophe, and apocalyptics like Malraux who formed his entourage did nothing to counter this mental bias based on his profession and his experience.’ In 1958 it seemed that France was approaching just such a catastrophe. While de Gaulle was to be the ultimate victor of this situation, his victory was by no means an obvious likelihood in the spring of 1958. Although an opinion poll in January had put de Gaulle as first choice for Prime Minister in a wide field, this was with a mere 13 per cent of the opinions expressed. And when, during the ministerial crisis of that spring, President Coty privately sounded out de Gaulle on whether he would be willing to try to form a government, de Gaulle wearily replied that the people did not want him (5 May 1958). Nor did his candid comments to journalists about the likelihood of Algerian independence suggest someone who counted on coming to power on the backs of settler and military discontent.