La regulación y la práctica del referéndum en Suiza: un análisis desde las críticas a la institución del referéndum

Abstract

It has been common in the literature to emphasize the dysfunctions that thepractice of the referendum can lead to in democratic systems. Stephen Tierney has synthesized three alleged dysfunctions. First, the referendum can imply the control of the process being exercised by a few elites and the possible manipulation of the result (the elite control syndrome). Second, the referendum can tend to aggregate prejudices, rather than forming opinions through processes of deliberation (the deliberation deficit). Third, the referendum consolidates majorities, without taking into account either minority or individual interests (the majoritarian danger). The aim of this article is to analyze the regulation and the practice of the referendum in Switzerland, the country with most experience of this field, to try to discern up to what point the critiques of the institution of the referendum correspond to the reality of the Swiss experience.