Abstract

Regional Policy in the USSR: Theory and Practice. This article examines spatial problems in the Soviet Union in terms of four main aspects which dominate both the theory and the practice of Soviet regional policy: — The importance of the role of the state; — The predominance of the sectoral principle; — The close relationship between politics and economics, and the contradictions which arise between administrative and economic boundary lines, all combine to lend Soviet iegional policy its particular characteristics. At the same time, the size and growing impact of territorial considerations on economic development have compelled the Soviet authorities to give increasing attention to the need for a more efficient regional policy which will take account of the complexity of the problems now arising. The grave regional imbalances (between the west and the Asian areas) which reflect different levels of regional development, require a considered economic policy designed to make allowance for the diverse historical, economic and socio-cultural patterns of each region. Set against the totality of the problem, succeeding attempts, from the period of Khrushchev onwards, reveal the disparity between aims and the measures taken to implement them. As regards regional development, the greater scope acquired by republican and regional authorities over the last two decades is still offset, either by lack of success of the plans themselves, or by difficulties often arising as a result of obstacles created by the central authorities. At the same time, the models elaborated by various centres in this area of research remain for the most part, theoretical and ill-adapted to implementation at the practical economic level. These various limiting factors, which are both technical and operational, reflect a contradiction which is rooted in the Soviet system itself. The predominance of sectoral planning over regional planning is simply an expression of the logic of state centralization which culminates in complete economic and political control. Thus the surface weaknesses and contradictions which manifest themselves, are inherent in the nature and operation of the Soviet system itself. More objectively, the overall effects of these weaknesses arise from the inability of the central planning authorities to plan a long-term policy of economic growth, and to determine its form and scope.

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