Abstract
The aim of this essay is to present a straightforward interpretation of some main passages where Aristotle reveals what he understands by πeιραστική. Usually interpreters believe his inspiration has drawn from the philosophical profile of Socrates and its elenchus. Faced with a number of difficulties presented by influential views, I argue that there are no reason to believe that Aristotle would have distinguished peirastic from dialectic neither by the figures of their syllogisms nor because their starting points have a different nature of the endoxa. By contrast, I defend the thesis that peirastic can be seen as a certain kind of expert knowledge that in practice becomes manifest as a successful refutation moment of the philosophically applied dialectic; at that moment the dialectic stricto sensu becomes reluctant to change the course of search for the principles of expert knowledge, insofar as such a movement would be a change in the direction posed by the sophistical threat of apparent wisdom on a given subject. I try to show how part of the – in Aristotle’s view – dialectical activity of Socrates fits in with various requirements of their inferential art of Topics. I suggest that this does not mean that Aristotle has built the peirastic on Socratic elenchus, but that he has used part of Socrates’ activity as philosophical evidence for his own fundamental dialectical conceptions.
Highlights
La dificultad general surge the philosophical profile of Socrates and its elenchus
Faced inmediatamente: ¿cuál es su diferencia, entonces, with a number of difficulties presented by influential views, con la dialéctica por sí?. ¿Hay en (C1) dos técnicas
En ese caso tendríamos una misma función defend the thesis that peirastic can be seen as a certain kind de «la dialéctica por sí y de la facultada of expert knowledge that in practice becomes manifest as a para examinar»
Summary
Ἔστι δὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι λόγων τέτταρα γένη, / διδασκαλικοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ πειραστικοὶ καὶ ἐριστικοί·. 131 ss): el sofista – como Aristóteles lo consideró en relación con sus estudios sobre la peirástica – cumple con las condiciones para subsumirse a uno de sus conceptos de alazṓn 91) y, entonces, la peirástica con arte se revela como esa actividad dialéctica mediante la cual el interrogador es capaz de desenmascarar por refutación a la clase de sofista que presume de tener un saber experto sin tenerlo realmente. Fait (2002, p.449-50) cree, incluso, que una de las razones obvias de que la peirástica fuera introducida por Aristóteles es que ella «evoca la figura de Sócrates: puesto que él era precisamente el maestro de la refutación de los sofistas y en general de aquellos que proclamaban ser sabios por cualquier razón, es del todo evidente que el arte de la crítica se recortó sobre su perfil filosófico». Aristote soutiendrait-il que le dialecticien doit mettre a l’epreuve comme s’il savait (ὡς εἰδώς, b3) alors qu’il reconnait au contraire, au chapitre 11, qu’il est tout a fait possible, pour celui qui ne sait pas (μὴ εἰδώς, 172a23 ; τὸν μὴ εἰδοτα, 172a24), de proceder a une mise a l’epreuve ?»
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