La injusticia epistémica y la justicia del testimonio

Abstract

In this article we try to problematize the notion of testimonial injustice, through a historical-philosophical reconstruction of some contemporary uses of testimony. The literature on testimony in the twentieth century does not always consider the philosophical discussion of the epistemic meaning of testimony, although both issues could be articulated better if testimony is understood from its recent historical uses, and the interpretation of historic testimony is held on an adequate conception of the discursive device of witnessing. We conducted a philosophical analysis of testimonial discourse and a historical review of its use in two testimonial contexts: Holocaust Testimonies and Latin American literature of testimony. As a result of this historical-philosophical reconstruction, we suggest to expand the notion of testimonial injustice so that, apart from disregard or rejection of the word of others, it incorporates the rarefaction of witnessing, which can be recognized in a certain expressivist contemporary paradigm of testimonial memory.