La Gran Bretaña frente al México amenazado, 1835–1848

Abstract

How would Britain support Mexico during its crisis with the United States over Texas? To answer this question, Josefina Zoraida Vázquez explores diplomatic papers documenting the relationship between Mexico and Great Britain. Although Vázquez’s impressive list of previous publications includes studies of the early Mexican Republic and the United States, this work broadens the view to evaluate Britain’s role. The slim volume consists of a brief introductory study followed by the important documents upon which it is based. Vazquéz studies the relationship between Mexico and Great Britain beginning with the asiento of 1713, which gave British trade an entry into the Spanish Empire. The British government wanted a commercial agreement with Mexico, despite King George IV’s objection to recognizing Mexican independence. The United States and Great Britain were competing for business and influence in Mexico, although the latter was clearly dominant. Henry John Temple, Lord Palmerston, as the Foreign Minister in the Whig government, recognized Texas in 1840, believing that Mexico could not retake it.In 1841, Sir Robert Peel’s Conservative government put George Hamilton-Gordon, Lord Aberdeen, in the Foreign Office. Lord Aberdeen wanted to block U.S. expansionism, and he considered joining forces with France to do so. He decided, however, that war with the United States was an impossible risk to British commerce. Aberdeen urged Mexico to recognize Texas independence in order to safeguard California. But Antonio López de Santa Anna wanted to conquer Texas instead.When the war came, Britain stayed neutral and used that position to expand business opportunities. Lord Palmerston and the Whigs were back in power in 1846. British representatives in Mexico were intermediaries in the peace negotiations. José María Luis Mora, representing Mexico in London, tried to persuade Palmerston to guarantee the peace treaty. Palmerston declined, saying that both Parliament and the United States would need to approve such a commitment, which was unlikely.Vázquez concludes that British policy supported British interests. Under both Palmerston and Aberdeen, those interests were largely commercial, even before the 1846 settlement with the United States on Oregon. Mexican leaders hoped for British support, since Mexico was a needed source of silver and Mexico had been assured that she was a special ally. British interests at the time, however, were less concerned with the potential for trade and investment in Mexico than with the actual enormous volume of trade between Britain and the United States.About one-third of the documents printed in the book are from the British Foreign Office files in the Public Records Office. The balance are from the Archivo Histórico “Genero Estrada” of the Mexican Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores. Only two documents date before 1844. The many documents included from the 1844-48 period substantiate the major points of Vázquez’s introductory study.In addition to access to the archival documents in Spanish, this book makes two historiographic contributions. The central part of the study is meticulously documented from archives, producing an ideal example of research for students. Vázquez also provides a good example of the value of British sources in Latin American historiography.