La filosofía de Peirce y su aplicación al problema del origen de las innovaciones evolutivas

Abstract

The discussion about the origin of evolutionary variations is taken as an example in order to justify the need to construct an ontological framework inspired in Peirce s cate-gories that integrate and move beyond dual polarities in which scientific discussions are locked in. The scientific community is divided between a mainstream Neo-Darwi-nian school that defends the blind and random production of variations, and a growing minority the Neo-Lamarckian school that sees variations as originated as a result of organisms and environment interactions. In the last decade epigenetic theories (Evolu-tionary Developmental Biology –EvoDevo- and Developmental Systems Theory –DST-) have proposed that evolutionary variations depend upon genotypic and phenotypic plasticity that enable organisms responsiveness to local environmental conditions by means of phenotypic adjustments at different levels (metabolic, physiologic, ontogenic, behavioral). This proposal opens up a way to overcome the dualism between chance and determinism, since it correlates with Peirce s categorical system and his vision of evolution as a process of sign interpretation. Epigenetic theories become an illustrative example of how to overcome dualisms between randomness and determinism in agree-ment to Peircean ontology that conceives evolution as a process of sign interpretation. Peircean categories studied as dyadic relations generate six characteristics that were iden-tified by Taborsky (2002, 2004) and applied by Andrade (2007) to the understanding of evolutionary theories, namely: (1.1) firstness as firstness (unconstrained possibilities), (2.2) secondness as secondness (discrete and definite actualizations), (3.2) thirdness as secondness(real possibilities given the restrictions at a determinate point in space and time), (3.1) thirdness as firstness (statistical distribution of realized actualizations), (2.1) secondness as firstness (election of real possibilities that are to be exteriorized and actualized) and (3.3) thirdness as thirdness (integration of actually existing realizations and emergence of new possibilities). Neo-Darwinism emphasizes the externalist stance described by relations (2.2) and (3.1), nonetheless an account that depends solely on them is insufficient if the internalist stance (1.1) and (3.2) and the two connecting relations (2.1) and (3.3) are not included. The two latter relations account for the process of abductive inference by means of which a new hypothesis is advanced aiming to deal with a new fact of observa-tion by making an original use of previous accumulated knowledge along evolutionary history. The explicit recognition of creative actions posed by organisms, analogous to natural abduction processes explains why responses to local conditions of life account for its open an unpredictable character. Natural abductive inference accounts for organisms permanent tendencies: 1. to vary and diverge and 2. to establishing new interactions that increase evolutionary potential.