Abstract
In this article, the existing relationship between procedural civil law and interpersonal comparison is examined. By means of the aforementioned examination, a critique of the efficiency criteria (essentially the Kaldor-Hicks criterion) which has been formulated when situations of interpersonal comparison are generated will be discredited. The efficacy of this criticism will be investigated, and starting with the contributions of Amartya Sen, it will be concluded that all of the factors of social decision, whether they originate from considerations of justice or equity, are subject to the same difficulties which this comparison imposes. Nonetheless, reasons will be expressed for which in civil procedural law these difficulties tend to decrease.
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