Abstract

Abstract This author analyzes the position taken by the Bank of France during discussions about reform of the international monetary system. These debates were marked by de Gaullian criticism of the imperialism of the dollar and a fairly acrimonious conflict between France and the United States, which lasted from 1963 to 1968. We can see that there were ambiguities in the French bank's position. While the bank agreed with the French government and its European partners about the defects in the system, it was impossible to achieve a coherent European stance on methods of reform. It seems that the government's view about the role of gold, its attitude at the time of the sterling crisis, and its stance on managing the bank's gold reserves all served to estrange the bank from its colleagues and damaged the latter' s ability to influence debate and decision-making. However, we should not overestimate the degree to which a more cooperative French attitude might have helped further European solidarity in face of the stance taken by America.

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