L'évolution de la supervision bancaire et de la réglementation prudentielle (1945-1996)

Abstract

The evolution of banking supervision and prudential regulation (1945-1996) The United States long relied on banking supervision and regulatory structure (bank charters, deposit insurance and risk-adjusted capital standards) to prevent financial instability. On the contrary, European countries had a tradition of strong central banking and credit policies, which were considered as efficient as comprehensive regulations. Both systems equally failed to avoid systemic risk because of central banks passivity or incentive defects in the regulatory structure. In the 1970s, with increasingly interdependent euromarkets, the G-10 and EEC countries reinforced monetary policies and harmonized prudential regulations. The Basel concordat established an international responsibility of the home country's banking supervisory authorities and the Cooke ratio generalized the US type of capital adequacy regulation. Intrinsic deficiencies implied however seeking further improvements to address more efficiently moral hazard issues. JEL classifications : E44, G21, G28, N24