Abstract
ABSTRACT : This paper deals with the semantic approach which makes a strict opposition between real definitions, having to do with objects and their properties, and nominal ones (which analyse representations or meanings into their constituent parts). In defense of this approach, Bolzano shows that paradoxes arise when one tries to fuse together < real » interpretation and nominal combination. Putnam however argues in a collection of well-known papers that there is no class of truths of a purely semantic or nominal nature. Linguistic uses always depend on states of the world. It is shown that once some of the requirements of a Fregean kind are dropped. Putnam's arguments can be countered. Katz's own strategy on this issue is compared with Bolzano's.
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