L’infini anthropologique et la phénoménologie: Une réflexion sur la phénoménologie dans l’anthropologie contemporaine

Abstract

The paper tries to elucidate some of the implications of using phenomenology in anthropological research. The starting point is Blumenberg’s critique of the Husserlian Anthropologieverbot, against which he proposes a phenomenological anthropology as a “description of man” that can never be completed. This idea resonates with the use of phenomenology in contemporary ethnographic and anthropological works: the problem stems from the “disempowering” effect that this anthropological use has on the phenomenological analytical power. Phenomenology has, from an anthropological point of view, the great advantage of offering a “trans-ontological” perspective able to let the Other speak. Many influential anthropologists cite Merleau-Ponty as a key figure in their approach, as in the case of Csordas’ “embodiment paradigm”, Jackson’s “existential anthropology” or Throop’s idea of an “ethnographic epoché”. This is equally true for two of the key figures of the “Ontological turn”, Descola and Ingold, albeit in radically different ways. On the contrary, it is difficult to find philosophers influenced by “non-philosophical” anthropology. The paper discusses both advantages and limits of phenomenological approaches in anthropology, adopting philosophical and anthropological perspectives, attempting to understand the deeply asymmetrical relation of the two disciplines.