Abstract
AbstractThis article discusses several recent interpretations of Frege's philosophy of arithmetic, particularly those developed by C. Wright, M. Dummett, and G. Boolos. After proposing a new interpretation of § 10 of the Grundgesetze (about the indeterminacy of the referents of the names of the courses-of-values), and rejecting Dummett's analysis of Frege's failure in terms of impredicativity, I examine Boolos's objections to the analyticity of “Hume's Principle.” I wish to highlight the philosophical question: is the model-theoretical concept of validity adequate to the “intuitive notion” of the logically true?
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