Kurdish–Iraqi state conflict (de‐)escalation following the independence referendum

Abstract

AbstractMoral hazard theory assumes that the responsibility to protect (R2P) raises expectations of third‐party intervention, thus creating a perverse motivation for vulnerable groups to act aggressively and incite a situation where foreign intervention becomes necessary to preserve their own safety. The promise of external intervention encourages vulnerable groups to rebel against their parent states under the assumption that intervention increases the likelihood of success and lowers the expected cost. Alan Kuperman describes moral hazard theory as the taking of risks that may inadvertently derive from trying to protect from risk, with unwanted results. This paper asks, if there are divisions, conflicts, or a security dilemma arising between factional leaders within a vulnerable group, how does that affect the decisions of the group with regard to taking risks? Taking the case of the PUK’s decision not to fight Iraqi armed forces and thereby prevent conflict escalation following the 2017 independence referendum, this paper argues that divisions between factional leaders affect a group's choice to take risks, reducing its likelihood. Consequently, conditions are less likely to reach the point of existential danger where outside intervention becomes necessary.