Abstract
Perhaps the strongest argument for scientific realism, the no-miracles-argument, has been said to commit the so-called base rate fallacy. The apparent elusiveness of the base rate of true theories has even been said to undermine the rationality of the entire realism debate. On the basis of the Kuhnian picture of theory choice, I confront this challenge by arguing that a theory is likely to be true if it possesses multiple theoretical virtues and is embraced by numerous scientists–even when the base rate converges to zero.
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