Krym. Rossiya…Navsegda? Critical Junctures, Critical Antecedents, and the Paths Not Taken in the Making of Crimea’s Annexation

Matteo Fumagalli,Margaryta Rymarenko

doi:10.1017/nps.2021.75

Matteo Fumagalli, Margaryta Rymarenko

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2021.75

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Abstract

AbstractRussia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 is widely framed as an outside-in process, not only enabled but also enacted by the Kremlin. Prevailing accounts privilege geopolitical analysis and place those developments in a broader narrative of tension and competition between the West and Russia. Such a narrative downplays the involvement of local actors and the importance of the choices they made prior to and during those events. This article revisits the period leading up to March 2014 through a focus on critical junctures, critical antecedents, a near miss, and the path not taken. It argues that a full account of Crimea’s incorporation into Russia – while acknowledging Moscow’s role – cannot ignore the local contingencies that preceded and shaped it. We understand the region’s annexation as a key moment of institutional change in Ukraine and focus our attention on explaining how that outcome was determined, identifying the path to such a political outcome. Yanukovych’s decision to “catapult” political-economic interest groups from Makeevka and Donetsk into the peninsula led to the marginalization of the local elite. Regime change in Kyiv and a slow and cumbersome response from the new authorities in February-March 2014 triggered, but did not cause, Crimea’s exit option.

Highlights

Even a hasty trip to post-annexation Crimea is unlikely to see the visitor miss the many billboards showing Russia’s President Vladimir Putin as he – timelessly – reminds locals that “Krym. Rossiya
As we show later in this article, is that plausible alternatives existed in the case of Crimea, including a new bargain andincorporation into Ukraine
When asked about the possibility of referendum for secession, he called it “unnecessary,” because “Crimea had sufficient ability to solve its own problems” (Samar 2014). These statements suggest that the Crimean leaders were primarily concerned with the state of center-region relations in case of power change in the capital. Their calls for separatism were instrumental in influencing Kyiv, but at that point their action was not geared towards secession.The ousting of Yanukovych on February 22 marked a turning point for Crimea, when secession turned from a bargaining strategy against Kyiv into an actual strategy for the political survival of the Crimean elite

Summary

Introduction

Even a hasty trip to post-annexation Crimea is unlikely to see the visitor miss the many billboards showing Russia’s President Vladimir Putin as he – timelessly – reminds locals that “Krym. Rossiya. Even a hasty trip to post-annexation Crimea is unlikely to see the visitor miss the many billboards showing Russia’s President Vladimir Putin as he – timelessly – reminds locals that “Krym. On February 27, 2014 the so-called “little green men” took over the administrative buildings of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the regional capital city of Simferopol. Within the three weeks they effectively neutralized all Ukrainian military bases on the peninsula and blocked the two points of entry to the region from mainland Ukraine (Armians’k and Chonhar).

Matteo Fumagalli and Margaryta Rymarenko

Findings

Conclusion