Abstract

This chapter discusses and examines Kripke’s semantical theory of self-referential truth in which he posits that models come first. This theory is arguably the most influential semantical theory of truth today, and its similarities with Tarski’s semantical notion of a model is explored here. Like Tarski, Kripke has been an inspiration for those taking a proof-theoretic approach to truth. Some of the strongest and best axiomatic theories of truth result from attempts to axiomatize some of his models for the language of truth. This chapter also examines Kripke’s diagnosis of the liar paradox, and how the notion of model must be modified in order to leave room for the possibility that for some sentences, neither they nor their negation hold.

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