Abstract
Abstract Kripke presented one of the most inuential modal arguments against psycho-physical identities. His argument as exemplified by the identity of pain and its respective neural correlates will be analysed in detail. It shall be argued that his reasoning relies on an implausible conception of introspection implying an implausible conception of mental phenomena such as pain. His account does not consider possible interaction of pain and attention as well as the interaction of pain with other psychological factors. Theoretical and empirical evidences for a diferent account of pain, which represent a challenge for Kripke's argument, will be discussed.
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