Abstract

In this paper, we propose Kripke-style models for the logics of evidence and truth LETJ and LETF. These logics extend, respectively, Nelson’s logic N4 and the logic of first-degree entailment (FDE) with a classicality operator ∘ that recovers classical logic for formulas in its scope. According to the intended interpretation here proposed, these models represent a database that receives information as time passes, and such information can be positive, negative, non-reliable, or reliable, while a formula ∘A means that the information about A, either positive or negative, is reliable. This proposal is in line with the interpretation of N4 and FDE as information-based logics, but adds to the four scenarios expressed by them two new scenarios: reliable (or conclusive) information (i) for the truth and (ii) for the falsity of a given proposition.

Highlights

  • IntroductionThe aim of this paper is to present Kripke-style models for the logics of evidence and truth LETJ and LETF , introduced in [1,2]

  • [2] Section 2.2.1.) Conclusive evidence is subjected to classical logic, and non-conclusive to a paraconsistent and paracomplete logic that is N4 in the case of LETJ and first-degree entailment (FDE) in the case of LETF

  • Sound and complete valuation semantics were presented for LETJ and LETF in [1,2], respectively

Read more

Summary

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to present Kripke-style models for the logics of evidence and truth LETJ and LETF , introduced in [1,2]. The semantic values True, False, Both and None, of what became known as Belnap–Dunn 4-valued logic, express the circumstances in which the computer receives, respectively, only positive, only negative, conflicting and no information at all, about a proposition A. In addition to these four scenarios, LETJ and LETF are capable of representing two additional scenarios: when ○A does not hold, we have the four scenarios above, but when ○A holds, exactly one among A and ¬A holds, which means that the information about A, positive or negative, is reliable and subjected to classical logic.

The Logic LETJ
From LETJ to LETF
Persistence Clauses and Information Revision
Persistence Conditions
Adding Persistence to LETF
Some Properties of LETJ and LETF
Final Remarks and Further Research
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call