Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency by Henry H. Perritt (review)

Abstract

786 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO Wheatley's treatment oftheAbkhazianand SouthOssetianconflicts sometimes tooreadily reflects theGeorgianperspective. One examplemustsuffice: he acceptsthattheNationalGuardleaderTengizK'it'ovaniwas responsible forsparking theAbkhazianwar by entering thecapitalSukhum'whenhis mandatewas merelyto establishcontrolover the railwaysand highways' (p. 73). The onlyproblemwiththis(widelyaccepted)interpretation is that attackson rail-traffic in 1992 were takingplace not in Abkhazia but in Mingrelia, wherea civilwar withthe Zviadistswas in progress. However, Wheatleyrightly concludesthat'itwas an internal factor[.. .] thatprovided the pretext forthe war in Abkhazia.Russia merelyexploitedthe stateof affairs' (p. 224). Overall,thisisa valuablesourceofdepressing facts on GeorgiainthelateSoviet /early independent years. Thejudgement onthefirst yearofSaak'ashvili's presidency, namely'Saakasvhili'sinsistence on reintegrating thebreakaway regions risked unleashing a dangerous conflict thatcouldeasilyinvolve Russia' (p. 209), provedall too prescient. However,if I have a reservation, it is Wheatley'sreliance on the forceof determinism, when he assertsthat, after9 April1989,'anyleader of [...] the Georgianopposition would have been constrainedto take exactlythe same uncompromising positionas Gamsakhurdia' (p. 61)or that'theAbkhazwarwas a final, tragicand inevitableconsequenceofthe9 Aprilmassacre'(p.73).Thisistoofacilean excuse. The Abkhazian warwas completely avoidable,had onlyTbilisibeenreadyto discuss theproposals tabledbySukhum fortalks on new(concederai relations. Whatwas neededinthelate1980swas a doseofcommonsense.Ifno-onein Georgiacouldsee this, thenthatsociety deserves condemnation foritscollectivelackofwisdom ;ifsomedidsee theneedbutchosetoremainsilent, then itremains bothforindividuals to addresstheirfailure ofmoralcourageand forsocietyto ponderwhysuch such individuals wereafraidto speaktheir mind. University ofLondon George Hewitt Perritt, Henry H. Kosovo Liberation Army: TheInsideStory ofan Insurgency, UniversityofIllinoisPress ,Urbana and Chicago,IL, 2008. xi + 230 pp. Map. Illustrations. Notes.Appendices. Bibliography. Index.$40.00. The titleofthisbookis rather misleading. It suggests a fairly densestudy of a relatively brief Balkaninsurgency ofa decade ago,theimpactofwhichwas soonsubsumed bywiderregional and international dynamics. A book,therefore ,whichis likely to appeal onlyto thosewitha particular interest in the Kosovo crisis. In fact,HenryH. Perritt providesthe readerwithsomething of significantly broaderresonance. He skilfully usesthestory oftheKosovo Liberation Army(KLA) as a vehicleto developinteresting and veryrelevantanalyses aboutthenatureofcontemporary insurgencies and waystorespondtothem, bothinternally and internationally. These discussions are at theheartofthe REVIEWS 787 book.Perritt arguesthattheKLA's singular achievement was to successfully reverse traditional insurgency theory, basedprimarily on thewritings ofMao Zedong. Mao held thatit was essentialto developa basis ofwide popular support before armedinsurgent groups couldsuccessfully prosecute their aims. In Perritt's view, KLA leaders deliberately and successfully createdtheir insurgency first - and effectively fromscratch - as a meansofdeveloping widerpublicsupport insideKosovo. Althoughhe makesclear fromthe startwherehis sympathies lay (the book is dedicatedto 'theyoungfighters and leadersoftheKLA, forwhom couragereplacedhumiliation'), Perritt strives toexamineSlobodanMilosevic's counter-insurgency techniqueswithcommendableobjectivity. He suggests thatSerbforces cameverycloseto destroying theKLA on severaloccasions before theNATO military intervention inspring 1999,and thatmostoftheir counter-insurgency strategy was effectively implemented. The fatalerror was to introduce ethniccleansingofthewiderAlbanianpopulationin Kosovo. Not onlydid thisact as an effective recruiting sergeant forthe developing KLA, it also played the key role in persuadingNATO leaders to act themselves. Kosovo - and Balkan issuesgenerally providea notoriously stern testofscholarly objectivity. It is to Perritt's creditthathe evidently triesto meetthetest, notwithstanding hisclearsympathies fortheKLA. On occasion, however,he does allow moralrelativism to intrudeupon hisjudgements. This is particularly evident in thechapter(11)on attempts toprosecute KLA leadersforallegedwarcrimes. Perritt's position seemsto be thattheyshould notbe prosecuted, in partbecausethescale oftheircrimeswas notas great as thoseofvariousSerb leaders.This maybe true,but a crimeis a crime whether itsvictims are numbered in thedozensorin thethousands. In addition ,theinternational tribunal investigating Balkanwarcrimes alreadysuffers from allegations ofbeinginsufficiently even-handed in itsapproachto investigating the allegedmisdemeanours of non-Serbs.Its reputation is scarcely likely to be boostedifPerritt's approachis adopted. Perritt's sympathetic viewoftheKLA also leads himto perhapsoverstate itsperceived importance in thelate 1990s.He asserts earlyon thattheKLA 'wasone ofthemostsuccessful insurgencies ofthepost-cold warperiod'(p. 2) and thisis a recurring themeofhisanalysis. Unfortunately perhaps,internationalleadersat thetimeevidently sawitas onlya bit-part player.The KLA was notincludedintheClintonadministration's efforts topersuadeMilosevic to cease ethniccleansingand reduce 'excessive'Serb forcesin Kosovo in autumn1998.As it transpired, thiswas a singular error.Initially the Serbs showedsignsof complying withthisagreement. When it became apparent thatKLA fighters were simplytakingover the military positionstheyhad vacated,however, thedeal begantofallapart.It is alsoworth noting thatthe KLA had no rolein theprocesswhicheventually led to theend ofNATO's bombing. The agreement whichfacilitated thisregardedtheKLA as merely a problemto be dealtwithas quickly as possiblebydecommissioning. The caveatsenteredabove do not significantly detractfromthisbook's essential value.It usesthestory oftheKLA to developcogentand important 788 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO analysis ofhowinsurgencies ariseand howtheycan be effectively dealtwith, bothbythetarget stateand thewiderinternational community. In anyfuture edition,Perritt shouldseriously considerrevising histitleto makeclearthe book'swiderscope and relevance.The...