Abstract
ABSTRACTThe Korean Peninsula is perceived by both the United States (US) and China as the region where they could cooperate despite other disputed problems. The Four-Party Talks were proposed amid a crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1996, and the Six-Party Talks were convened during the controversies over the subsequent Iraq War in early 2000s. The author argues whether this “Ad-hoc Concert” still survives as an analytic framework for examining Sino–US relations on the Korean Peninsula, notwithstanding the new dimension of collective security as a result of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea)’s nuclear issues with respect to the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). This paper first examines the Chinese initiatives in the nuclear crisis in 2016–17; it makes an assessment of the developments of the triangulated US–China–DPRK relationship after Chairman Kim Jongun referred to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in early 2018. In the successive Summit meetings that Kim Jongun held with the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea)’s President Moon Jaein, and US President Donald Trump, the declaration to end the Korean War dominated those in the triangulated relations. This paper also reviews the controversies related to that declaration and their implication for Sino–US relations. Those implications will provide the basis for an analysis of Sino–US relations on the Korean Peninsula following a speech delivered by US Vice-President Mike Pence in October 2018 that was widely seen as a declaration of a “new cold war” between the US and China.
Highlights
China as the region where they could cooperate despite other disputed problems
This paper first examines the Chinese initiatives in the nuclear crisis in 2016–17; it makes an assessment of the developments of the triangulated United States (US)–China–DPRK relationship after Chairman Kim Jongun referred to the “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” in early 2018
Those implications will provide the basis for an analysis of Sino–US relations on the Korean Peninsula following a speech delivered by US Vice-President Mike Pence in October 2018 that was widely seen as a declaration of a “new cold war” between the US and China
Summary
Consolidate China’s own sphere of influence while limiting the risk of direct military confrontation with the US. China’s capacity to directly shape security arrangements on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War, has lacked both a direct military presence and at times any formal involvement in North Korea’s attempts to negotiate a peace deal directly with the US. Following the People’s Volunteer Army’s withdrawal from the Peninsula in late 1950s, China later lost its institutional foothold in the Korean peace process when it withdrew its representative to the Military Armistice Commission in 1994 in support of the DPRK’s plan to exclude the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) from its efforts to conclude a peace treaty with the US replacing the 1953 Military Armistice Agreement (MAA). China, disadvantaged by by Pyongyang’s efforts to deal directly with Washington and the presence of the US forces in the ROK, supported the Four-Party Talks proposed by Washington and Seoul in early 1996, which aimed to build an interKorean peace regime in defiance of the DPRK’s “New Peace Arrangement” plans. “Chaohe Wenti: Zhongmei Liangguo de Liyi Junheng yu Zhanlüe Boyi”
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