Abstract
AbstractThe system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the Federal Republic of Germany has been always extremely difficult to regulate. The Parliamentary Council of 1948/49 left this task unfinished, and the first fiscal reform of 1955 was only partly successful. The 1969 reform seemed to be more successful, but it became clear quite soon that intensified interlocking politics created new problems for the decision-making process. Also, it created incentives to finance public policies by debts. The financing of German unity was based on the 1969 regulations. In recent years the overburdening of the existing rules became obvious. Growing problems caused a shift of paradigm in the direction of less interlocking politics and financing.
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