Knowledge, Strategy, and Momentum in Presidential Primaries

Abstract

Two dynamic rational choice models of primaries are analyzed that demonstrate both reformers and their critics are right about primaries. Primaries can provide public instruction and a better informed electorate, and they can be poorly designed lotteries: A “recognition” and learning model describes how changing media coverage affects voters' knowledge about candidates and their subsequent voting behavior. A “strategic” voting model describes the dynamic implications of strategic voting and “horse-race” coverage by the media. We find that the recognition model has the normatively appealing dynamic of information leading to broadly self-interested outcomes while the strategy model has the unappealing behavior of a lottery the odds of which are fixed by the media's harsh judgments of who's winning and who's losing.In coming to these conclusions, this paper illustrates a number of methodological points such as the usefulness of macromodels based upon assumptions about individual behavior, the analysis of macromodels using methods from electrical engineering, the strengths and limitations of analytical results versus simulations for understanding dynamic models, and the use of “ideal type” recognition and strategic voting models to clarify the systemic consequences of individual risk aversion and strategic voting. More generally, the paper shows how models can be used as narratives or parables for organizing disparate observations, refining our intuitions, and directing our research efforts.