Abstract
We empirically analyze determinants of knowledge-sharing in firms operating under coopetition. We note that actions taken by firms can be substantive or symbolic, and the ratio between them helps assessing firm’s engagement in knowledge-sharing. Our analyzes suggest that firms are more likely to disguise their intentions using symbolic actions when four complementary conditions are met. From these results conditions, we derive four higher-order constructs that comprise a contractual structure under coopetition: contractual benefits, knowledge ambiguity, joint input production, and pricing of knowledge stocks. They represent our theoretical intent towards a theory that integrates contracting and knowledge elements to explain under which conditions firms are more willing to share knowledge under coopetition. Our work offers contributions to literatures in strategic management, institutional theory, and move forward Brandenburger and Nalebuff's (1996) ideas on coopetition tactics.
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