Abstract

The Knobe effect (Analysis 63(3):190–194, 2003a) consists in our tendency to attribute intentionality to bringing about a side effect when it is morally bad but not when it is morally good. Beebe and Buckwalter (Mind Lang 25:474–498, 2010) have demonstrated that there is an epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE): people are more inclined to attribute knowledge when the side effect is bad in Knobe-type cases. ESEE is quite robust. In this paper, I present a new explanation of ESEE. I argue that when people attribute knowledge in morally negative cases, they express a consequence-knowledge claim (knowledge that a possible consequence of an action is that harm will occur) rather than a predictive claim (knowledge that harm will actually occur). I use the omissions account (Paprzycka in Mind Lang 30(5):550–571, 2015) to explain why the consequence-knowledge claim is particularly salient in morally negative cases. Unlike the doxastic heuristic account (Alfano et al. in Monist 95(2):264–289, 2012), the omissions account can explain the persistence of ESEE in the so-called slight-chance of harm conditions. I present the results of empirical studies that test the predictions of the account. I show that ESEE occurs in Butler-type scenarios. Some of the studies involve close replications of Nadelhoffer’s (Analysis 64(3):277–284, 2004) study.

Highlights

  • I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for a very careful reading of the text and for making valuable criticisms and suggestions that made rethink many of the issues discussed in the paper

  • I use the omissions account of the Knobe effect (Sect. 2.1) to argue that another knowledge claim, a consequenceknowledge claim (Sect. 2.2), is salient when omissions are in play, i.e. in the harm case (Sect. 2.3)

  • The participants were asked to give a forced-choice answer to the intentionality question and the corresponding knowledge question (KnKill, KnBull, KnWin, or KnSix). They were asked to justify their response to the knowledge question. If they chose the answer “Yes, Brown knew that Smith would be killed”, they were given three options as possible justifications: Brown was aware that a possible consequence of his action was that Smith would be killed

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Summary

Introduction

I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for a very careful reading of the text and for making valuable criticisms and suggestions that made rethink many of the issues discussed in the paper. I argue that DHA (and the puzzling-help strategy in general) has problems with accounting for the persistence of ESEE in the slight-chance of harm scenarios. Beebe and Buckwalter (2010) presented people with the vignettes Knobe used in his original study (2003a): The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but [and] it will harm [help] the environment.

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