Abstract
Top management teams (TMTs) play an important role in enterprises. How to improve the cooperation of TMTs in the process of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprise is a new era theme and currently a key objective in China. In this paper, we use evolutionary game theory to research the dynamic behavior of TMTs from the perspective of knowledge input and knowledge flow. We construct the evolutionary game model from the dimensions of knowledge input, knowledge flow, cooperation costs, government reward, and government penalty firstly, then we explore the strategy selection on knowledge input or not in the cooperation of TMTs between state-owned enterprise and private enterprise. Finally, we discuss the model's local stability and perform a simulation analysis of the factors that can influence the stability of the model. The results show that the final strategy choices of TMTs between two parties are related to not only the initial payment matrix constructed but also the selection of the initial parameters of the partners: Under different situations, the strategy evolution result will be stable at (input, not input), (not input, input) and (input, input). Increasing the degree of knowledge flow, government reward, and government penalty and reducing the cooperation costs between state-owned enterprise and private enterprise can promote the TMTs' cooperation in the process of the mixed ownership reform. Based on the conclusions, we put forward relevant suggestions for enterprises and the government. We hope that this research can provide some sustainable solutions to improve the cooperation of the TMTs between state-owned and private enterprise.
Highlights
At present, China’s economic development has entered a new normal and its economic growth has gradually shifted from high-speed growth to medium high-speed growth
Under the background of the mixed ownership reform, we make some assumptions based on the cooperation of Top management teams (TMTs) between state-owned enterprise and private enterprise in real life firstly
We use the evolutionary game theory and duplicate dynamic equation to explore the dynamic cooperative behaviors of state-owned enterprise TMTs and private enterprise TMTs based on the perspective of knowledge input and knowledge flow
Summary
China’s economic development has entered a new normal and its economic growth has gradually shifted from high-speed growth to medium high-speed growth. Scholars have done a lot of researches around the TMTs, few scholars have studied the dynamic cooperation behavior among top management teams from the perspective of evolutionary game theory at the micro level, fewer scholars study the dynamic cooperative behavior between state-owned executives and private executives from the perspective of knowledge flow. In order to fill in the gap that knowledge input and knowledge flow in senior executives’ cooperative behaviors, this paper uses the evolutionary game theory to explore the dynamic cooperation behavior of top management teams in the process of the mixed ownership reform from the perspective of knowledge flow. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND MODEL CONSTRUCTION Hypothesis 1: In the process of the mixed ownership reform, it is assumed that TMTs of state-owned enterprise and private enterprise carry out cooperative activities constantly, and they have two strategic choices: Knowledge input and knowledge not input.
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