Abstract

ABSTRACTThe debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.

Highlights

  • Knowing-how seems to be a distinctively practical kind of knowledge

  • The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability

  • My goal in this paper is to explore a view that combines the weak anti-intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of ability with the weak intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions that answer the question how to V? According to the interrogative capacity view, knowing how to V is one’s standing in a certain kind of ability-to-answer relation to the question how to V? This view is not completely novel: Masto [2010] and Farkas [2016a, 2016b] defend related views of knowledge-wh, Michaelis [2011: 278] suggests this view of knowledge-how in passing, and Dickie [2012] and Stanley and Williamson [2016] develop related views of skill

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Summary

Introduction

Knowing-how seems to be a distinctively practical kind of knowledge. Yet, according to the standard semantics for knowledge-how ascriptions, to be truly said to know how to do something requires standing in a relation to a proposition about how to do it. Intellectualists about knowledge-how typically take their lead from the semantics of knowledge-how ascriptions, claiming that knowledge-how is a kind of propositional knowledge. As a consequence, they have trouble explaining the practical properties of knowledge-how. Since abilities are typically relations to activities rather than to propositions, anti-intellectualists have the parallel problem of making their view compatible with linguistic theory. I explore a novel compromise position: the interrogative capacity view. According to this view, knowledge how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. I argue that combining a propositional object with an abilitative relation makes the view uniquely well-placed to defuse the tension between semantic theory and the practicality of knowledge-how, and allows it to illuminate the relation between knowledge-how, propositional knowledge, and abilities

Logical Space
The Interrogative Capacity View
Answers
Questions
Situations
Answering by Doing
Formulating the View
Benefits of the Interrogative Capacity View
The Tension between Linguistics and Practicality
Criticism and Responses
Interrogative Capacities and Intellectualism
Knowledge-How and Skill
Is ‘On the Fly’ Mysterious?
Is the Interrogative Capacity View Linguistically Implementable?
Does the Interrogative Capacity View Over-Intellectualise?
Conclusion
Full Text
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