Knowledge, Belief and the Forms

Abstract

In order to distinguish between the philosopher and the non-philosopher, Plato draws a distinction between knowledge and belief, and in doing this he makes a two-fold distinction between, on the one hand, two different states of mind, and on the other between two different sets of objects corresponding to these different states of mind. The philosopher’s state of mind is knowledge and its objects are Beauty itself, Justice itself, and so on (i.e. the Forms) ; the nonphilosopher’s state of mind is belief and its objects are the many particular things, just acts and so on. We ought now to ask ourselves whether there is in fact a distinction to be drawn between knowledge and belief, and if there is, whether Plato’s way of representing the distinction is satisfactory.KeywordsTrue BeliefDirect ObjectIdeal StandardMathematical PropositionBook VersusThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.