Knowledge and reasoning

Mona Simion

doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03251-z

Abstract

This paper develops a novel, functionalist, unified account of the epistemic normativity of reasoning. On this view, epistemic norms drop out of epistemic functions. I argue that practical reasoning serves a prudential function of generating prudentially permissible action, and the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. This picture, if right, goes a long way towards normatively divorcing action and practical reasoning. At the same time, it unifies reasoning epistemically: practical and theoretical reasoning will turn out to be governed by the same epistemic norm—knowledge—in virtue of serving the same epistemic function: generating knowledge of the conclusion.

Highlights

IntroductionThe specialist literature tends, with very few exceptions, to lump discussions of the epistemic norm of action together with discussions of the epistemic norm of practical reasoning. In contrast, discussions of the epistemic normativity of theoretical
The specialist literature tends, with very few exceptions,1 to lump discussions of the epistemic norm of action together with discussions of the epistemic norm of practical reasoning.2 In contrast, discussions of the epistemic normativity of theoreticalThis article belongs to the topical collection “Knowledge and Decision”, edited by Moritz Schulz, Roman Heil, Jakob Koscholke, and Patricia Rich.1 3 Vol.:(0123456789)Synthese reasoning tend to be carried separately from discussions of the normativity of practical reasoning
On the view proposed here, all epistemic norms are generated by associated epistemic functions, in the same way in which biological norms are generated by biological functions

Summary

Introduction

The specialist literature tends, with very few exceptions, to lump discussions of the epistemic norm of action together with discussions of the epistemic norm of practical reasoning. In contrast, discussions of the epistemic normativity of theoretical. I argue that practical reasoning serves (1) in line with action, moral and prudential functions of generating morally/prudentially permissible action, and (2) the epistemic function of generating knowledge of what one ought to do. In virtue of this latter function, practical reasoning will be governed by a corresponding epistemic norm.

Normative functionalism

Epistemic functionalism

No epistemic norm for action

Action and practical reasoning

Knowledge and good reasoning

Conclusion