Knowing the World and Knowing Our Minds

Abstract

In Reason, Truth and History Hilary Putnam (1981) offered an argument purporting to show that Brain-in-a-Vat (hereafter BIV) skepticism can be refuted on the assumption that central features of the causal theory of reference are correct. Many philosophers have discussed Putnam's proposal, defending both the pro and con sides of the debate.' The debate continues in the current literature with Putnamians such as Tymoczko and Dell'Utri offering ever more intricate defenses of the anti-skeptical position and critics such as David and Brueckner rebutting these defenses. As things now stand, Putnam's critics are carrying the debate. Philosophers, I claim, have come to a (perhaps loose) consensus that although the BIV hypothesis is false, it is not provably false: the Putnamian anti-skeptical project is a failure. Unless a major improvement is forthcoming from the Putnamian camp, anti-skeptical arguments like that of Putnam will remain in disfavor. In this paper, with an eye on some of the recent literature concerning first person knowledge of mental content, I will provide the needed improvement.