Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing

Abstract

This chapter draws on earlier ones in developing a critique of intellectualism, especially as applied to the philosophy of action. For intellectualism, theoretical knowledge is more basic than practical knowledge, and action, at least if performed for a good reason, must be knowledge-guided and not just guided by otherwise appropriate beliefs. Intellectualism is shown too strong on at least three counts. Knowing how is not reducible to knowing that; knowledge is not required for premises of practical reasoning; and (normative) reasons for action need not be factive, much less constituted by known propositions. These conclusions by no means imply that knowledge is not important for understanding action and practical reasoning, especially rational action and good practical reasoning. It is also true that intentional actions correspond to (possibly hypothetical) practical reasoning; but this point is shown to be very different from the intellectualist view that they are based on actual practical reasoning.