Knowing Good and Doing Good

Abstract

There is an implicit assumption in the minds of the uninitiated that there exists a considerable--if not an absolute--relationship between knowing good and doing good. That certainly was the assumption this naif carried with him when, twenty-five years ago, he first entered into the Byzantine world of moral philosophers. Had not Socrates reassured me during my undergraduate days that moral knowledge would lead, by a straight (if not a short) route to just moral conduct? During my first workshop with what were then the leading lights in normative philosophy, a number of unpleasant incidents arose that were called to my attention as one of the organizing directors of the meeting. One of the distinguished philosophers, a married, middle-aged man, was sexually involved with an undergraduate who was working for him. Another distinguished philosopher managed to use this (and subsequent workshops) as an occasion for sexual pursuits of a nature aggressive enough to be labeled harassment by current standards. Beyond these sexual misdemeanors, our moralists demonstrated a degree of hostility, lack of spiritual and emotional generosity, level of personal calumny and gossip mongering, and a proclivity for both backbiting and public humiliation that was, charitably speaking, at least equal to the prevailing academic norms in medicine, law, and the social sciences. Yet I knew that relatively unsophisticated individuals, who would not know a utilitarian from an electrician or a deontologist from an endodontist, often act with grace and good will. Over the years I have come to the inescapable conclusion that philosophers--despite a considerably higher degree of knowledge of ethics--comport themselves by no higher set of moral standards than do nonphilosophers. I am therefore reluctantly driven to recognize that a direct quantitative relationship between knowing good and doing good does not exist. There is no reason, of course, why there should be a relationship between knowing and applying that knowledge. We revere knowledge, beyond utility, in its purest form. Indeed there is a snobbism in the academic world that seems to honor the pursuit of pure knowledge over applied wisdom. I have little patience with this hierarchic elitism. For the mathematical sophisticate, quantum theory holds an elegant aesthetic that is sufficient unto itself; I am told by a mathematician-musician friend that understanding the quantum theory was one of the greatest aesthetic experiences of his life. For the rest of us, its nobility is best appreciated when knowledge is transformed into improving the human and natural condition. Still and all, knowledge may enrich the environment in many ways beyond any present or even future practical application. There is, after all, no reason to believe that the study of aesthetics contributes to increased artistic productivity in a culture, or for that matter is even helpful to individual artists. Nonetheless, the study of aesthetics, of philosophy of art, has a legitimate place in the academic agenda. Similarly, I will presume that the sophisticated knowledge of philosophical research and reasoning will contribute to the production of ethical theory and analysis, and, as significant, hold a central position in the life of the mind. But how important is the place of theory and analysis in the moral life? The question under examination here is not the legitimacy of moral philosophy, but the more circumscribed question of whether, or to what degree, or under what special circumstances we can assume that knowing good leads to doing good. Being better informed does not seem to translate in any direct fashion to better conduct on the part of the expert. Can it, however, lead to the better conduct of others? To what degree does information inform human conduct? These questions drive us into a different area of expertise: the field of human motivation and human behavior. …