Können Klone eine Identität ausbilden?

Abstract

Using Habermas’ reflections on biogenetic techniques as an example, the paper argues that critiques of reproductive cloning tend to overrate the formative power of genes and underrate the subjective contribution to the constitution of identity. Unintentionally this strengthens a deterministic concept of human beings as suggested in (popularized versions of) sociobiology, behavioral genetics, and brain research. Empirical data are presented to show that uniqueness and autonomy — the core aspects of personal identity — cannot be experienced from the third-person perspective of an objective observer, but only from the first-person participant’s perspective. The feeling of uniqueness does not depend on knowing that one’s genes are matchless; the experience of autonomy is not endangered by knowing that one’s genes have been manipulated. Instead, both derive from willingly affirmed commitments to values or ideals.