Kissinger’s wrath: the reassessment of the US-Israel relationship (March 1975)

Abstract

This article delves into the often-overlooked emotional aspect of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s decision-making during the 1975 Shuttle Diplomacy, focusing on the US-Israel relationship. While historical records commonly highlight policy nuances and international dynamics, this article illuminates Kissinger’s personal emotions, arguing that these played a pivotal role in his policy decisions. It presents a thorough examination of various records reflecting Kissinger’s interactions with key figures, including Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and President Gerald Ford. The analysis demonstrates how Kissinger’s emotional responses influenced the intensity of his diplomatic pursuits and reactions to obstacles. This approach not only enhances our understanding of the disengagement agreement negotiations, but also fosters a linkage between diplomatic history and the history of emotions. It propounds that emotions are a crucial aspect of decision-making analysis, both at an institutional and individual level.