Abstract
Transnational human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been plagued by the overarching question of the domestic legal status of customary international law (CIL). Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. is the Supreme Court's second installment on the ATS. Like Sosa v. Alvarez-Machainbefore it, Kiobel does not expressly address the domestic legal status of CIL, but it does provide clues. Those clues suggest two insights: the Court views CIL as external to U.S. law, rather than as part of federal common law, and the role of CIL in future cases may be affected less by arguments about CIL's status as federal common law than by arguments about congressional intent.
Highlights
As is well known, the debate over the domestic status of customary international law (CIL) has produced two principal camps
Transnational human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)[1] has been plagued by the overarching question of the domestic legal status of customary international law (CIL).[2]
Adherents of the modern position, with support from the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, maintain that CIL is a type of federal common law
Summary
Transnational human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)[1] has been plagued by the overarching question of the domestic legal status of customary international law (CIL).[2] Kiobel v. Alvarez-Machain[4] before it, Kiobel does not expressly address the domestic legal status of CIL, but it does provide clues. Those clues suggest two insights: the Court views CIL as external to U.S law, rather than as part of federal common law, and the role of CIL in future cases may be affected less by arguments about CIL’s status as federal common law than by arguments about congressional intent
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
