Kinds, Things, and Stuff

Abstract

Abstract We might hear that marshmallows are sweet. Here, we are talking about the kind marshmallow and assert that individual instances of this kind have the property of being sweet. Strangely, we are prepared to believe these so‐called generic sentences even though we are aware that there are some bad‐tasting marshmallows. What can make these generic sentences be true even when there are exceptions? This question has led philosophers, linguists, and researchers in artificial intelligence to search for semantic theories that could accommodate this phenomenon. The word water is a mass term; the word dog is a count term. One can count how many dogs are in the room, but not how many waters are in the room, for water is just “present.” The philosophical and linguistic literature is rife with semantic theories concerned with an account of this ontological difference and how it can be learned. This volume of contributions by noted researchers in the psychology of language uses material from the investigation of human performance and child‐language learning to broaden the range of options open for formal semanticists in the construction of their theories.