Kim Nossal Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada Toronto

Abstract

Reviewed by : J.L. Granatstein, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Toronto jgranatstein@rogers.comThat defence procurement in Canada has been and is mess is beyond dispute. From the Ross Rifle at the turn of the century to the CF-105 Arrow, from the botched Sea King helicopter replacement to the Iltis jeep, the continuing F-35 fighter debacle, and host of other delayed equipment purchases, Canadian governments and the Canadian defence establishment have wasted years and billions of dollars and left the nation's defenders exposed to unnecessary risk. The title, Charlie Foxtrot , is military speak for Cluster F@#k, and that derogatory title lays out the scope of the mess. Kim Nossal's clearly written and well-researched book offers good history and calm judgments that tell us how Ottawa might do better.The blame for this situation rests on many. First in line is the Canadian people. With the sole exception of the early Cold War years when Louis St. Laurent's Liberal government spent up to 8 percent of GDP on the armed forces, Canadians have never been willing to pay for defence at level that would provide the military with the best weaponry. We have been easy riders, Nossal says rightly enough, willing to be marginal players militarily and happy to let the Americans defend us, moaning about protecting Canadian sovereignty notwithstanding. It's always defence on the cheap. But it's not only the people's fault. The military for the last 65 years or so has always wanted to be capable of filling all combat roles, something that the easy riding voters will not pay for, but something that the generals and admirals call for without cessation lest their service be sharply cut. That Cabinet ministers have gone along with this while knowing that they would never provide the funds necessary for state-of-the-art equipment for all three services puts them to shame as well. The result, Nossal states bluntly, is that Canada is not a serious country (147).This situation persists. Today there are three ministers responsible for defence procurement, virtual guarantor of delays and turf wars. There is the high and increasing inflation of defence costs, not least in naval vessels and aircraft. The ever-increasing US dollar exchange rate runs up costs. There is the ongoing scarcity of experienced procurement specialists in the Department of National Defence, legacy of the Jean Chretien and Paul Martin budget cuts in the mid-1990s that laid off the experts. …