Abstract
This chapter shows that the account of the threat/bystander distinction developed in Chapter 1 undermines both Michael Otsuka’s argument against a permission to kill innocent threats and Judith Thomson’s argument in favour of such a permission. It then explores and rejects Jonathan Quong’s account of permissible defence, arguing that his position is overly permissive and internally inconsistent. It argues that the fact that someone is going to non-defensively kill an innocent person is morally significant even if the threatening person is morally innocent. Drawing on Victor Tadros’s recent work, the chapter suggests that it is permissible to make an innocent threat bear significant costs to stop her from killing an innocent person. Combined with a lesser-evil justification, this permits the killing of innocent threats in self-defence.
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