Kilka uwag o teorii interpretacji konstytucyjnej Ronalda Dworkina na przykładzie klauzuli wolności słowa

Abstract

The article analyses the concept of constitutional interpretation of Ronald Dworkin, one of the most eminent representatives of contemporary liberal legal thought. Its basic assumption is the conviction that fundamental laws contain abstract concepts which are the domain of political philosophy (e.g. ‘freedom’, ‘property’, ‘due process’), and that those who interpret them – judges in particular – must refer to axiological, ontological or epistemological findings in an attempt to find the best possible interpretation of such terms. Dworkin rejects the originalist paradigm of interpretation, which assumes a static content of the provisions of the Basic Law. The interpreter is obliged to search for the proper meaning of the constitution, regardless of both the intentions of its drafters and its original public meaning. The article also shows Dworkin’s application of this theory to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in the area of freedom of speech.