Abstract
In this article, I argue that Kierkegaard’s analysis of the self and the concept of despair introduces another approach to the self that is different from the one found in humanistic psychology. Rather than seeing the self as something organic, something universally and privately given to the individual to develop, Kierkegaard presented a dialectical and a relational understanding of the self, wherein the notion of “the other” is central. Central in Kierkegaard’s analysis in Sickness Unto Death are two modalities when it comes to despair: the despair of not willing to be oneself and the despair of willing to be oneself. Kierkegaard’s analysis of the despair of willing to be oneself can be read as a strong critique of the notion of self being constituted by itself, as argued by humanistic psychology.
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