Kierkegaard and Heidegger on the Concept of Guilt

Abstract

Abstract This chapter considers the role of guilt in the thought of Kierkegaard and Heidegger. Kierkegaard contrasts the quantitative and external guilt which belongs to life in the crowd with the guilt that attaches to the infinite demand, which is qualitative and internal, and thus falls under the category of ‘totality’. This means, however, that guilt feeds of itself, as one comes to feel guilty for feeling guilty. Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger does not just consider guilt in relation to ordinary ethical and judicial norms, but also in relation to one’s existence, but this means that for Heidegger it becomes ontological, as we feel guilty even for existing. Thus, both Kierkegaard and Heidegger draw similar distinctions between forms of guilt, and make guilt in its fundamental form inescapable, but while Heidegger gives this a purely ontological basis, for Kierkegaard it takes an ethical form in relation to an infinite demand.