Abstract
Side channel analysis (SCA) represents frequently occurred and major type of attack against implementation of any cryptographic protocols. SCA has ability to directly attack on small part of the key and aggregate this information over different encryption. We can prevent SCA attack by changing secret key at every run. Leakage resilient cryptography is used to design cryptographic protocol that remains secure in the presence of arbitrary information about the secret key. In this paper we proposed a framework which protects the current cryptographic standard and also evaluate SCA-security. We send the secure data using any cryptographic primitive (AES) running in a mode of operation. We can also choose Shannon's Security mode to send data using cryptographic primitive (One Time Padding). We are using switch to ensure that stateless key-updation using alternative or random algorithm choice such as AES or OTP will be used, instead of relying on one single technique.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
