Abstract
Some cryptographic protocols are vulnerable to replay attacks, a type of weakness that was a focus of attention in the Burroughs-Abadi-Needham logic. Newer, more operational approaches to protocol analysis have not concentrated on this type of attack. This paper fills the gap for the strand space theory.The main technical point is to provide a definition of recency. Our candidate is convenient because we already have a powerful way to prove events recent, namely the incoming and outgoing authentication tests.A secondary purpose of this paper is to illustrate an easily mechanized pattern for using the authentication tests.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
