Kemalists, Islamists, and Liberals: Shifting Patterns of Confrontation and Consensus, 2002–06

Abstract

This article analyzes shifting patterns of confrontation and consensus between adherents of three Turkish political camps: Kemalists, Islamists, and liberals. It is argued that their proclivity to cooperate or clash is a function of how domestic and international forces impinge upon their respective understandings of secularism and pluralism. From 2002 to 2005, an Islamist–liberal consensus, supported by pro‐EU Kemalists, drove EU accession‐oriented reform. This consensus collapsed by late 2005 due, at the domestic level, to debates over the Islamic headscarf and Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, and at the international level, to worsening EU–Turkey relations and the altered geo‐strategic balance in the Middle East. These developments fueled a Kemalist–Islamist confrontation over secularism while providing for a common Kemalist–Islamist position on national identity politics. Since Kemalists control the state and Islamists the government, the Islamist–Kemalist clash over secularism and consensus over identity politics has excluded liberal views from the policymaking process, effectively halting reform.