Kees van Deemter: Not Exactly: In Praise of Vagueness

Abstract

To a first approximation, the sorites paradox, or paradox of the heap, proceeds thus.Consider n ? 1 grains of sand, and let n be large enough so that n ? 1 grains ofsand clearly and unambiguously make a heap. Consider, then, the followingprinciple: if n ? 1 grains of sand make a heap, then surely n grains also make aheap. Putting both seemingly acceptable assumptions together, we may concludethat n grains make a heap. Yet, if we can once reason along these lines, we canequally well apply this reasoning n times, and thus conclude that even a single grainof sand makes a heap. This last conclusion surely can’t be true, yet we arrived at itby (seemingly) correct reasoning from (apparently) true premises. An obviouslyfalse or at least clearly unacceptable conclusion that follows from otherwiseintuitively true premises is all we need to have a genuine paradox.One of the things van Deemter does is to defend a specific solution to the soritesparadox. However, this book does much more than that, and differs in that respectfrom the literature on vagueness philosophical logicians are accustomed to. In fact,apart from a brief description of the sorites paradox in the introduction, we have towait until Chapters 7 and 8 for a discussion of paradox as we know it.Already in the introduction van Deemter makes clear what his real target is;namely, the concept of False Clarity. The underlying theme of this book is the clashbetween vague expressions and concepts, and our tendency to talk and think aboutthese concepts as if they were crisp. By these lights, the sorites paradox is nothingmore than one particularly telling symptom of a broader phenomenon (though, inview of the more mundane examples van Deemter reviews, perhaps also amisleadingly artificial one).While most treatments of the phenomenon of vagueness traditionally focus on thesemantics of vague predicates, the present book sets out to answer at least two more